Researchers in Singapore design new ‘more efficient’ DAO scheme

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A team of researchers from the Singapore University of Social Sciences recently evaluated existing decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) voting schemes to determine which was the most efficient.

The researchers ultimately concluded that each of the existing popular voting schemes had their drawbacks and advantages and that a new paradigm combining what they believed to be the best features of each would be “more efficient” than the status quo.

Dubbed “Voting Schemes in DAO Governance,” the team’s paper Analysis Eight current technologies for DAO governance and an assessment of their perceived strengths and weaknesses.

Technologies reviewed include: token-based quorum voting, quadratic voting, weighted and reputation-based voting, knowledge-extractable voting, multisig voting, holographic consensus, conviction voting, and rage quitting voting.

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Each voting scheme is rated on five parameters including efficiency (proposal selection and approval speed), fairness (with regard to voter equality), scalability (ability to adjust storage/count/communication according to number of voters), robustness (resilience against resistance) The vectors were evaluated accordingly. attacks and collusion), and incentive schemes (whether the design motivates voter behavior).

The “Holographic Consensus” scheme received the highest overall rating, with “high” scores in all but the “strength” category.

Screenshot of the “Voting Schemes in DAO Governance” research paper.

Once the analysis was complete, the researchers set out to build “a hypothetical voting mechanism for purely decentralized and permissionless DAO governance”. To accomplish this, he devised a plan to speed up conviction voting with a “holographic apparatus”. According to the study:

“We know that the downside of the conviction voting mechanism is that it takes time to approve an instant proposal. To address this concern, we introduce a blind staking mechanism: each member stakes a certain amount of their tokens. One can choose to bet on any proposition with no.

This method would allow stakeholders to stake tokens against the proposal’s passage or veto and, depending on the outcome, the proposal would either be accelerated or slowed down – thus potentially increasing the overall speed and robustness of DAO governance. Will be

The team’s proposed plan would also implement an incentive paradigm where those who voted “Veto” would sacrifice their tokens if consensus went to those who voted “Pass” and vice versa.

According to the researchers, this ensures that stakeholders will be incentivized to submit “a good proposal that is more likely to be passed and rewarded,” thus speeding up the processing of proposals that are both necessary and good. It is believed.

The researchers claim their proposed plan subverts attempts at the status quo, but they acknowledge it is not without its inherent problems:

“Our concept plan has a better design incorporating key features of other plans. However, it is not foolproof and may face challenges in implementation. Nevertheless, we aim to inspire innovative design thinking.